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COMMENTS
PROBABLE FUTURE PROJECTS: THEIR ROLE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972 the California Supreme Court rendered a decision
which has exerted a profound influence on environmental law
within the state. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervi-
sors of Mono County' the court held that the California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act (CEQA)2 applied not only to govern-
ment projects, but also to any private projects requiring
governmental permit or entitlement.$ Thus, local government
agencies were obliged to consider the potential environmental
impact of private projects and to prepare environmental im-
pact reports (EIRs) on those projects which might have a sig-
nificant effect on the environment."
This decision has generated an eight-year stream of litiga-
tion which reflects continued confusion over when an EIR is
to be prepared, why it is to be prepared and how it is to be
prepared. A review of these cases and the responses which
they have provoked reveals a particular concern over CEQA's
requirement that agencies must examine every proposed pro-
ject in conjunction with "probable future projects" to deter-
mine if the proposed and future projects might exert some cu-
mulatively significant effect on the environment.3 Such a duty
0 1981 by Jean Y. Eastman.
1. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
2. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977).
3. 8 Cal. 3d at 266, 502 P.2d at 1061, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
4. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, § 21002.1 (West Supp. 1981).
5. Id. § 21083(b) provides that a project may have a significant effect on the
environment if:
The possible effects of a project are individually limited but cumu-
latively considerable. As used in this subdivision, "cumulatively consid-
erable" means that the incremental effects of an individual project are
considerable when viewed in connection with the effects of past projects,
the effects of other current projects, and the effects of possible future
projects.
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imposes a significant burden on local agencies. It is difficult
enough to examine proposals from a broad perspective aimed
at assessing how a new project will interact with already com-
pleted projects and others still in progress. The obligation to
consider future projects not yet begun, perhaps not even pro-
posed, has provoked the ire of many local agency officials who
believe that such inquiries produce nothing but idle specula-
tion, and stand in the way of projects that would benefit the
community.
Proponents of the expanded EIR argue that considering
the cumulative effect of probable future projects and current
proposals is necessary to carry out CEQA's intent to afford
maximum environmental protection. Looking ahead gives
agencies a chance to plan carefully for a community's future,
to articulate and balance competing interests, and to modify
proposed projects so as to mitigate potentially adverse effects
on the environment. Failure to examine the interaction be-
tween present and future projects often prevents proposals
from being as good as they might be, and in worst-case situa-
tions may produce consequences that are environmentally dis-
astrous. Consider the following hypothetical situation.
Suppose that the Owner of 1000 acres of land in a semi-
rural residential community conveys to Builder the option to
buy 600 acres. In return for the option, Owner receives the
right to share in the housing development that Builder will
place on the land. Owner and Builder apply to the local plan-
ning commission for approval of a tentative map subdividing
Owner's land into two parcels, one of 600 acres and the other
of 400 acres. This subdivision constitutes a "project" under
CEQA' and does not fall within the exemptions provided by
the Act.7 The planning commission must determine whether
this project may have a significant effect on the environment,
See generally Kane, From Friends of Mammoth to No Oil, Inc.: When Does a Private
Construction Project Require an Environmental Impact Report, 52 L.A. BAR J. 142
(1976).
6. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21065(c), 21080 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). Section
21065 defines "project" as including "[a]ctivities involving the issuance to a person of
a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public
agencies." See, e.g., 60 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. (1977) (lot splits of less than five acres are
not excluded from CEQA requirements); CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080(a) (West Supp.
1981) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this division, this division shall
apply to discretionary projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public
agencies, including, but not limited to, . . . the approval of tentative subdivision
maps .... "
7. Id. § 21080(b) (West Supp. 1981).
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thus requiring preparation of an EIR. The planning commis-
sion, concluding that subdivision constitutes merely a line on
a map, determines that the "project" has no environmental
impact and that an EIR is therefore not necessary. The offi-
cials recognize that actual development may indeed affect the
environment, but feel that it would be inappropriate to con-
sider this effect prior to receiving actual plans for the housing
project. Thus, the commission fails to consider impacts of
probable future projects. The planning commission approves
the subdivision without further environmental study, and
shortly thereafter Owner sells his remaining 400 acres to a
third party. Six months later Builder presents his develop-
ment proposal to the planning commission and requests per-
mission to begin building.
The proposed project includes construction of 300 homes.
There is no public access to the property at present; therefore,
roads must be put in before any other construction can begin.
Owner's original 1000 acres included a natural location for a
road that would have skirted a particularly beautiful portion
of land currently designated in the town's general plan as an
"open space preserve." Unfortunately, this perfect location
lies just 100 yards outside the boundaries created by the sub-
division map. According to the town's engineer, only two pos-
sible locations for a road into the proposed development re-
main. One location would result in the new road intersecting
with the town's main highway at a particularly dangerous
blind curve across from the community recreation center. The
other site would run directly through the open space preserve.
A difficult choice!
Owner's original land holdings included 200 acres of geo-
logically unstable terrain, 160 acres of which now lie in the
portion that Builder hopes to develop. A slight alteration of
boundaries could have included far more "buildable" land
within Developer's portion, but the planning commission's
limited focus on the present project at the time it approved
the subdivision map prevented it from taking into considera-
tion the likely need for potential building sites in the future.
The alternatives at this point are rather limited. The
planning commission could insist that Builder reduce the size
of his development to 175 homes, but that might destroy the
economic feasibility of the entire project. Builder may counter
with a request that the planning commission allow him to dis-
regard the town's one-acre minimum lot size requirement and
1981]
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allow him to cluster the homes in order to avoid the unstable
land. In addition to the aesthetic problems posed by such a
solution, officials must consider the fact that the only suitable
location for clustering 300 homes lies across the road from the
local elementary school. What will this mean in terms of
changing traffic patterns and increased danger to children?
Will prospective purchasers of these expensive homes be de-
terred by the prospect of having a school and all that goes
with it practically in their front yards? Clearly, at least from
hindsight, the planning commission has made an error, and
the entire community will pay the price.
There is nothing far-fetched about the circumstances de-
scribed above. Indeed, they are likely to become increasingly
common in an era of shrinking land and expanding popula-
tion. The need for increased housing and industrial facilities
is bound to result in utilization of existing open space. To
keep environmental damage to a minimum, CEQA requires
agencies to keep these pressures and their implications in
mind when assessing proposals for current projects.' As illus-
trated above, attention to probable future projects can be
beneficial, and the legislature has made it clear that consider-
ation of such factors is important.9
The means by which agencies are to fulfill this obligation
is considerably less certain. There remain gnawing questions
about the practicality of carrying out such a requirement in
the absence of further clarification from the courts or legisla-
ture. For example, how "probable" must a probable future
project be before an agency has to give it consideration? It
seems fairly certain that if a local agency has received an ap-
plication for permission to build as well as to subdivide, the
building project is sufficiently imminent to be examined con-
temporaneously with the subdivision application. One step re-
moved is the hypothetical situation described above where a
subdivision was proposed first, but with the clear understand-
ing on the part of the permitting agency that a request to
build would follow in the not-too-distant future.
The agency's duty becomes more obscure in the case of
an application to subdivide where no future plans are speci-
fied. Does the local agency have an obligation to inquire about
purposes and future plans before approving such a project?
8. See Id. §§ 21000, 21001 (West Supp. 1981).
9. Id. § 21083(b) (West 1977) quoted at note 5 supra.
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What if the land is zoned for residential use and the city's
general plan envisions eventual development of that area? It
is true that zoning can be changed and general plans
amended. Nevertheless, formal recognition of a land parcel's
suitability for future development might well create a pre-
sumption that some probable future project would be likely in
the absence of rezoning or general plan amendment. Would
the local agency have a duty to inquire about probable future
projects if it knew that neighboring areas were experiencing
significant housing pressures and had exhausted all available
land? This presents a difficult situation to evaluate because
pertinent data is hard to obtain. Common sense and examina-
tion of changing land use patterns in other nearby communi-
ties may lead an agency to believe that subdivision is just the
first step to development in its own community. However, this
view fails to account for a number of other variables, such as
the type of housing actually in demand and the kind of con-
struction permitted in the less populated community. If, for
example, a semi-rural area has a strong commitment to re-
stricting residential land use to single family homes on one-
acre parcels, it is unlikely that a neighboring city's need for
more inexpensive multi-family dwellings will lead to develop-
ment of the less urbanized town. It may also be of concern to
the local agency that the applicant is a developer who has al-
ready built five other housing developments on similar sites
which he purchased and subdivided rather than a cattle
rancher who has been grazing his stock on the property for 15
years. An applicant's past conduct may not be conclusive, but
depending upon the specific circumstances, such past behavior
might certainly be grounds for further inquiry before the
agency could state with certainty that future projects were
improbable.
Although CEQA has guidelines to aid in its implementa-
tion and clarification, 10 the guidelines fail to address such
questions. As a result, local agencies are left without guidance
on how they are to comply with the Act where probable future
projects are concerned.
II. CEQA: ITS STRUCTURE AND APPLICATION
The provisions of the California Environmental Quality
10. See 14 CAL. AD. CODE §§ 1681-1690.2 (West 1979).
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Act apply to all discretionary projects approved or carried out
by public agencies.11 As the Act itself specifies, "It is the in-
tent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state govern-
ment which regulate activities of private individuals, corpora-
tions, and public agencies which are found to affect the
quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so
that major consideration is given to preventing environmental
damage while providing a decent home and satisfying living
environment for every Californian." 1' CEQA attempts to
achieve this goal by employing a three-pronged system of stat-
utory provisions, state guidelines and local regulations.18
In considering the merits of any given project, the Act re-
quires a local agency to first determine whether the project is
likely to have a significant effect on the environment.1 4 If the
agency finds that the project will have no such effect, it must
file a "negative declaration" describing how it reached this
conclusion. 5 If, however, it appears that a project may exert a
significant effect on the environment, the agency must then
prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) concerning the
proposal.16 The EIR is a detailed informational document set-
ting forth the immediate and long-term environmental effects
of the project, the measures available to mitigate significant
environmental effects, and the possible alternatives to the
proposed project.17
To aid local agencies in their project evaluations, CEQA
provides for the creation of state guidelines by the Office of
Planning and Research. 8 These guidelines now exist as part
of the California Administrative Code" and provide "criteria
for public agencies to follow in determining whether or not a
proposed project may have a 'significant effect on the environ-
ment.' "20 CEQA further requires public agencies to formally
adopt "objectives, criteria, and procedures for the evaluation
11. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1977).
12. Id. § 21000(g) (West Supp. 1980).
13. See Seneker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mammoth -Develop-
ers Chase the Will o' the Wisp, 48 CAL. ST. B. J. 127, 131 (1973).
14. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21002 (West 1977).
15. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21064, 21080.1, 21082.1 (West 1977 & Supp.
1981).
16. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West 1977).
17. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 99 21002, 21061 (West 1977).
18. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 1977).
19. 14 CAL. AD. CODE §§ 1681-1690.2 (West 1979).
20. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21083 (West 1977).
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of projects and the preparation of environmental impact re-
ports and negative declarations" which are consistent with the
Act and the state guidelines.2 '
The real heart of the Act lies in its definition of "signifi-
cant effect" which, if found, requires preparation of an EIR.
CEQA requires an agency to find that a project may have a
significant effect on the environment if any one of three con-
ditions is present:
(a) A proposed project has the potential to degrade
the quality of the environment, curtail the range of the
environment, or to achieve short-term, to the disadvan-
tage of long-term, environmental goals.
(b) The possible effects of a project are individually
limited but cumulatively considerable....
(c) The environmental effects of a project will cause
substantial adverse effects on human beings, either di-
rectly or indirectly.2
It is the second condition from which the issue of "probable
future projects" arises.
In an attempt to clarify what "cumulatively considerable"
meant, the legislature provided the following definition:
"'[c]umulatively considerable' means that the incremental ef-
fects of an individual project are considerable when viewed in
connection with the effects of past projects, the effects of
other current projects, and the effects of probable future
projects."' The duty of local agencies to examine proposed
projects in future as well as present contexts seems clear
enough on the face of the statute. State guidelines written to
implement this section of CEQA only reinforce such an inter-
pretation: "Where an individual project is a necessary prece-
dent for action on a larger project . . . with significant envi-
ronmental effect, an EIR must address itself to the scope of
the larger project."2 ' Although this language seems clear,
there remains considerable doubt as to when the cumulative
potential of probable future projects constitutes a "significant
effect" on the environment requiring preparation of an EIR.
Thus, in the hypothetical outlined above it is arguable that
21. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21082 (West 1977).
22. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083 (West 1977).
23. Id. § 21083(b) (emphasis added).
24. 14 CAL. AD. CODE § 1685.11 (West 1980). See also § 1686.2(c) which makes
the finding of "cumulative effect" a "mandatory finding of significance" automatically
triggering the EIR requirement.
1981]
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the planning commission erred when it approved the tentative
subdivision map without considering probable future projects
or preparing an EIR. On the other hand, it is also reasonable
to argue that even if considered, the cumulative environmen-
tal effects of unspecified future projects and a subdivision
map approval are far from "significant" and thus, no EIR
should be required at that early stage of development.
III. LITIGATION UNDER CEQA RELATING TO PROBABLE
FUTURE EFFECTS
A representative sampling of opinions from the California
courts reveals the same lack of consensus about CEQA as ex-
ists among those who must follow its precepts. Ever since
Friends of Mammoth,2 5 with its emphasis on affording maxi-
mum protection to the environment, state courts have wres-
tled with the meaning of CEQA's mandate that a project's cu-
mulative effects, including probable future projects, be
examined prior to and during the EIR process.
Two years after Friends of Mammoth, No Oil, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles (No Oil)26 reached the California Su-
preme Court. While not dealing exclusively with cumulative
effects, No Oil bore significantly on the issue by setting a low
threshold to trigger the EIR requirement. The question in No
Oil was whether or not the drilling of several test wells by
Occidental Petroleum required preparation of an EIR.
Plaintiffs initially tried to force consideration of the project's
cumulative impacts by claiming that probable future projects
"encompassed commercial oil production in Pacific Pali-
sades." 8 The trial court declined to take so broad a view,
however, and confined its attention to drilling of the test
wells.
Arguments on both sides offered a perfect illustration of
the tension created by the "probable future projects" require-
ment. Plaintiffs stressed that it would be a waste of money to
drill test wells unless commercial production was to follow
and that environmental effects of such commercial develop-
ment were clearly relevant at this stage, since a finding of ad-
25. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
26. 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974).
27. Id. at 73, 529 P.2d at 69, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 37.




verse impacts might convince the local agency to disapprove
the test project." Plaintiffs argued that by limiting its inquiry
to the mere drilling of a few test wells, the local agency was
defeating the purposes of CEQA.3 1
The defendants, on the other hand, argued that they
needed geologic information from the test wells before they
could prepare an accurate EIR on the environmental effects of
commercial oil production.32 They looked to the federal courts
for support in insisting that preparation of an EIR without
reliable information on which to base it would "tend toward
uninformative generalities." 3
Since neither side in No Oil had briefed this question
thoroughly3' the court declined to decide the issue;' however,
it did offer a terse summation of the dilemma. Borrowing lan-
guage from Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc.
v. Atomic Energy Commission (SIPI), the court observed:
"[w]e are pulled in two directions. Statements must be writ-
ten late enough in the development process to contain mean-
ingful information, but they must be written early enough so
that whatever information is contained can practically serve
as an input into the decision making process."" This is the
very dilemma posed in the previously discussed hypothetical
subdivision. On the one hand, the planning commission could
see no value in addressing the impact of future development
at the subdivision stage; in the absence of a formal building
proposal it felt that such a focus would require the.agency to
do a great deal of guesswork. On the other hand, those argu-
ing for immediate consideration of future development might
have felt that such a study could provide information perti-
nent to planning a subdivision that would cause the fewest
adverse environmental effects.
Although the court in No Oil declined to address the is-
sue of probable future projects, its decision did provide am-
munition for those advocating strict construction of CEQA's
cumulative effects requirement by broadening the circum-
30. Id. at 77 n.5, 529 P.2d at 71-72 n.5, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40 n.5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34. 13 Cal. 3d at 77 n.5, 529 P.2d at 71-72 n.5, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40 n.5.
35. Id.
36. 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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stances under which an EIR must be prepared. The trial court
in No Oil had interpreted CEQA's language to mean that
agencies need only prepare EIRs when "there is a reasonable
possibility that the project will have a momentous or impor-
tant effect of a permanent or long enduring nature. 8 7 The
California Supreme Court disagreed with this test, choosing
instead to apply a test articulated in County of Inyo v.
Yorty. 8 That decision held that an agency must prepare an
EIR whenever it encounters some substantial evidence that
the project " 'may have' a significant adverse effect on the en-
vironment." 89 To employ a more restrictive test, said the court
in No Oil, would be to afford less protection to the environ-
ment than the Act intends. °
The court went on to note that preparing an EIR in close
cases has a special value because the EIR aids in informing
the public about a project's environmental consequences. The
very existence of an EIR can reassure citizens that their agen-
cies have in fact considered the impact that a project may
have on the environment.'1
No Oil sets a very low threshold to trigger the EIR re-
quirement. If CEQA's purpose is, as the court suggests, to
provide maximum protection to the environment, to supply
the public with information about a project's potential effects,
and to help insure that public officials make thoughtful, well-
informed decisions, then consideration of probable future
projects seems essential. Since there are situations where pre-
sent projects obviously will affect or be affected by future
ones, agencies cannot ignore future projects and still provide
the kind of environmental protection intended by the Act."
Not all courts, however, have accepted the strongly pro-
tective stance taken in Friends of Mammoth and No Oil; this
is particularly true where probable future projects were con-
cerned. In a number of decisions, including the often cited
Hixon v. County of Los Angeles,'8 Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v.
37. 13 Cal. 3d at 82, 529 P.2d at 75, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
38. 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
39. Id. at 814, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 390. See id. at 809, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 387 which
indicates that the presence of substantial evidence that the project "'may have' a
significant . . . effect" environmentally is sufficient to trigger the EIR requirement.
40. 13 Cal. 3d at 84-85, 529 P.2d at 77, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
41. Id. at 86, 529 P.2d at 78, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
42. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000, 21001 (West Supp. 1981).
43. In Hixon v. County of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. App. 3d 370, 113 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1974), plaintiffs urged preparation of an EIR to study the cumulative impact of a
[Vol. 21736
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City Council of Arcadia," and Natural Resources Council v.
California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission," the ap-
pellate courts have declined to look at the cumulative impact
of a proposed project in combination with probable future
projects. The California Supreme Court did not have occasion
to re-examine the issue until 1975 when it heard Bozung v.
Local Agency Formation Commission of Ventura County"'
which is reminiscent of the hypothetical subdivision and sub-
sequent development.
Plaintiffs in Bozung challenged a local agency's approval
of a plan annexing a tract of agricultural property to the City
of Camarillo for purposes of residential, commercial and rec-
reational development. The question arose as to whether the
local agency should have prepared an EIR on the annexation
because it was a "project" "which may have a significant ef-
fect on the environment.' 47 Relying heavily on language from
Friends of Mammoth which referred to projects "culminating
in physical changes to the environment,"'48 the Bozung major-
ity found that this particular annexation proposal definitely
county street improvement program that called for removing large numbers of trees.
The tree cutting had occurred in several distinct locations. Each location was dealt
with separately in the county's environmental review and it was determined that
there was no need for an EIR. The court upheld this exercise of agency discretion and
declined plaintiffs' request for an EIR covering all future tree removal within the
county.
44. Arcadia, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974) considered the cumu-
lative effects of several related proposals-a shopping center, parking lot, and street
widening project. Although the court agreed that all three should be viewed as one
project in evaluating their environmental impact, the proposals were exempt from
CEQA by reason of the Act's ministerial and validation provisions. Since the 72 acre
shopping center was part of a 400 acre parcel, petitioners argued that an EIR should
be prepared covering projected development of the entire 400 acres. The court, how-
ever, held that no EIR would be heeded until someone attempted to develop the as
yet unimproved portion of the 400 acre tract.
45. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Coastal Zone Conserva-
tion Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 76, 129 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1976), plaintiffs challenged the
Coastal Commission's failure to prepare an EIR before issuing permits for construc-
tion of 15 homes. The 15 homes were located in an area in which 1,550 building lots
had been sold and on which 340 homes had already been built. The court held that
the Commission need only consider the impact of building 15 homes and not the
potential impact of a full build-out. Therefore, no EIR was required.
46. 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975).
47. See CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 1977) which requires all local agen-
cies to prepare and certify the completion of an environmental impact report on any
project they intend to carry out or approve "which may have a significant impact on
the environment."
48. 8 Cal. 3d at 265, 502 P.2d at 1061, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
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required an EIR.'9 The cumulative effects of this project ap-
peared to weigh very heavily in the court's decision. The ma-
jority pointed to the fact that Kaiser Aetna, the real party in
interest, wished to subdivide the land, a project "destined to
go nowhere" without prior annexation. Once subdivision had
taken place, recreational, commercial and residential develop-
ment already in the planning stages could go forward, result-
ing in certain urban growth.5' Therefore, the court concluded
that it "seems idle to argue that the particular project here
involved may not culminate in physical change to the
environment. 
5 2
The Bozung court rejected the defendant's argument that
an EIR at the annexation stage would be wasteful because an-
other EIR would have to be prepared before any subsequent
rezoning proposal. In reaching its decision, the court noted
that a change in land use was definitely anticipated, and that
planning and conferences with local agencies regarding these
changes had already begun.53 It is CEQA's goal, said the court,
to provide information on the environmental consequences of
a project at the earliest possible stage; this purpose is clearly




Bozung is significant both for what it does and for what it
does not do. It does articulate, more clearly than any case
before it, the affirmative obligation that CEQA imposes on
agencies to consider probable future projects along with pre-
sent proposals in deciding whether or not there may be some
significant cumulative effect on the environment. It does not,
however, provide any guidance as to how agencies may fulfill
this obligation. The court takes the same ad hoc approach
here that it has used in the past. There is no effort to design a
test which agencies might employ in deciding whether or not
the cumulative effects of present and future projects are sig-
nificant enough to require an EIR. Neither here nor in any
other decision has the court attempted to define what sort of
49. 13 Cal. 3d at 279-81, 529 P.2d at 1027-29, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 259-61.
50. Id. at 281, 529 P.2d at 1029, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., 13 Cal.3d at 281 n.24, 529 P.2d at 1029 n.24, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 261
n.24, where the court cites specific details regarding the way in which annexation
would ultimately affect population density and vehicle emissions.
53. Id. at 281, 529 P.2d at 1029, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
54. Id. at 282, 529 P.2d at 1038, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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cumulative impacts an EIR should address. Agencies do not
know how far their predictions must range either in terms of
time or geography. The result, of course, is that the same is-
sues arise again and again.
As recently as 1979 the appellate court heard Whitman v.
Board of Supervisors, which challenged the sufficiency of an
EIR for failing to consider fully the cumulative effects of drill-
ing an exploratory well in Ventura County.5 The Board of
Supervisors raised the usual arguments in its defense: that the
"projection of possible projects would be based on specula-
tion" and that the "[g]uidelines do not require a cumulative
analysis of possible projects."5 In response, the court pointed
to specific language in section 15142 of the state guidelines
which requires an EIR to include "both existent and planned"
related projects in their cumulative impacts analysis. 7 The
Board had ignored this requirement, making no effort to in-
quire of companies already drilling in the area about their
plans for expansion. Nor did it consult with other public agen-
cies having jurisdiction over resources that might be affected
by the project. 8
The court criticized the EIR for its total lack of specific-
ity and detail, finding the cumulative impact discussion "ut-
terly devoid of any reasoned analysis. . ... -5 While there are
limits to the amount of information an EIR can feasibly pro-
vide, an impact report containing nothing but generalities un-
supported by data or scientific authority has little value. 0
Whitman illustrates the gap remaining between CEQA's
intent and its implementation. Courts unanimously interpret
the statute as mandating maximum protection for the envi-
ronment. Yet how is such protection to be won? If agencies do
not look beyond the strict geographic confines of a proposed
project, if government officials are unwilling to include in
their calculations the impact which future projects may exert
on the environment, then CEQA truly has little force.
The focus on cumulative effects is essential to the pur-
pose of CEQA. Agencies assessing projects may not close their
eyes to this requirement. The message is clear from the courts
55. 88 Cal. App. 3d 397, 151 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1979).
56. Id. at 410, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 412, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.
59. Id. at 411, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
60. See id.
1981]
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and legislature alike. But agencies responsible for carrying out
the provisions of CEQA have sent back an equally clear mes-
sage that this requirement is too difficult to fulfill in the ab-
sence of some uniform standards. The extensive litigation
under CEQA proves that the ad hoc approach has not worked.
On the contrary, it has created a confusing array of contradic-
tory decisions providing ammunition for those who would like
to avoid the mandate of CEQA, and no guidance at all for
those who sincerely wish to comply.
Where, then, are agencies to find uniform criteria for
use in environmental decision-making? CEQA was closely
modeled after the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA). 1 California courts have frequently looked to federal
analyses under NEPA when attempting to interpret CEQA
provisions.6 2 Environmental litigation in California has fol-
lowed a path similar in many respects to that of the federal
courts in interpreting their own environmental legislation. Yet
even at the federal level, agencies and courts have struggled to
determine the role future projects should play in the environ-
mental assessment of current proposals.
IV. THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Unlike California's statute, NEPA does not refer directly
to the "cumulative effects" of a project. However, considera-
tion of these effects has been frequently read into NEPA's re-
quirement that detailed statements be prepared in "every rec-
ommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. '"63 Early in NEPA's history it became
clear that this section was too vague to guide agencies in de-
termining the scope required of their Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS). In an attempt to remedy this problem, the
Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) drew up guidelines
to use in implementing the EIS requirement." Unfortunately,
not all agencies adopted these standards. As a result, the
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 and Supp. 11 1978). See also Seneker, supra
note 16, at 130.
62. Catalano and DiMento, Local Government Response to State Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment Requirements: An Explanation and a Typeology, 7 ENVT'L L.
24, 34 (1976).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
64. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-.6 (1980).
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courts inherited the task of trying to develop some uniform
criteria by which to determine the proper scope of an EIS."
Federal courts have wrestled with many of the same is-
sues under NEPA that the California judiciary has faced
under CEQA, particularly where the cumulative environmen-
tal effects of present and future projects are concerned." The
federal approach, however, has been a bit different from Cali-
fornia's. Federal courts sometimes take a very active role in
attempting to fill in the gaps left by the statute.' These deci-
sions also reveal a sharp difference of opinion as to whether
such an active judicial role is appropriate."
One of the federal court's first efforts to deal with the is-
sue of probable future projects under NEPA appeared in Sci-
entist's Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy
Commission (SIPI)." That case revolved around the federal
government's program to develop a Liquid Metal Fast
Breeder Reactor. The program encompassed a number of re-
lated research projects including construction of test facilities,
demonstration plants, and ultimately, construction of com-
mercial scale breeder reactor electrical power plants assisted
by government aid. In an effort to comply with NEPA, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) prepared impact state-
ments for one test facility and for the first demonstration
plant.70 Appellants, however, claimed that since the program
involved major federal action affecting the quality of the envi-
ronment, section 102(c) of NEPA7' required an EIS directed
toward the total research and development program.7 The
Commission argued that an EIS would be neither feasible nor
meaningful at that stage due to "[t]he remote and speculative
nature of the project," and further argued that any long-range
analysis would require the AEC to engage in fanciful guessing
65. For an historical analysis of the way in which the EIS requirement devel-
oped and the policy questions remaining, see The Scope of the Program Require-
ment: The Need for a Coherent Judicial Approach, 30 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1978).
66. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); City of Davis v. Cole-
man, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th
Cir. 1974); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
67. See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481
F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Akers v. Resor, 443 F. Supp. 1355 (W.D. Tenn. 1978).
68. See generally id. But see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 406, 416.
69. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
70. Id. at 1085.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
72. See 481 F.2d at 1085.
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games.73
In rejecting this argument, the court strongly supported
broad environmental impact statements and listed a number
of benefits that might follow.
Individual actions that are related either geographi-
cally or as logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions
may be more appropriately evaluated in a single, program
statement. Such a statement also appears appropriate in
connection with the development of a new program that
contemplates a number of subsequent actions .... [T]he
program statement has a number of advantages. It pro-
vides an occasion for a more exhausting consideration of
effects and alternatives than would be practicable in a
statement on an individual action. It ensures considera-
tion of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a
case-by-case analysis. And it avoids duplicative reconsid-
eration of basic policy questions.'
While recognizing that no agency "can foresee the unforesee-
able,"" the court found some degree of forecasting via impact
statements to be a fair and reasonable requirement.7
6
Members of the court grappled with the recurrent prob-
lem of when the EIS must be prepared. The documents had
to be prepared late enough to contain meaningful information,
yet early enough to aid in decision-making." In an effort to
solve this problem the court suggested four questions which
might guide agencies in determining whether the time was
ripe for an EIS:
How likely is the technology to prove commercially feasi-
ble, and how soon will that occur? To what extent is
meaningful information presently available on the effects
of application of the technology and of alternatives and
their effects? To what extent are irretrievable commit-
ments being made and options precluded as the develop-
ment program progresses? How severe will be the envi-
ronmental effects if the technology does prove
commercially feasible?78
73. Id. at 1086.
74. Id. at 1087-88 (citing Council on Envt'l Quality Memo, Agencies on Proce-
dures for Improving Envt'l Impact Statements, reprinted in 3 ENVIR. RE. (BNA) 82,
87).
75. Id. at 1092.
76. Id.




Recognizing that the balance of competing concerns may shift
over time, the court recommended that agencies create some
formal system to periodically reevaluate EIS timing where
long-term projects are involved.7 9 The court also suggested
that agencies be required to articulate their reasons for decid-
ing not to prepare an EIS at a particular time. Such a state-
ment would prove that an agency has adequately considered
the problem, and would provide a record that the court could
use if called upon to review the agency decision.80
Testing the. breeder reactor program against the stated
guidelines, the court concluded that the program would have a
number of cumulative effects on the environment, that the na-
ture of these effects was far from speculative, and that na-
tional concern over health hazards to the public made thor-
ough environmental review of the program essential at this
stage.81
SIPI was notable for its comprehensive treatment of cu-
mulative impacts and consideration of probable future
projects as a part of NEPA's environmental review process. It
identified the problems inherent in implementation and
pointed out the importance of examining these impacts. Fur-
ther, the decision attempted to offer guidelines, which agen-
cies could use to determine appropriate timing for environ-
mental assessments, and it provided an illustration of how
these guidelines might be applied in a specific situation.
One might expect that such a decision, coming early in
the life of NEPA, would diminish future controversy regard-
ing the intended scope of environmental review. This was not
the case. In 1975 Justice Powell delivered the U.S. Supreme
Court's majority opinion in Kleppe v. Sierra Club,"2 which
overruled the SIPI guidelines and again called NEPA require-
ments into question.
The issue raised in Kleppe was whether or not the federal
government must prepare a comprehensive EIS concerning its
programs for developing coal resources in the entire northern
Great Plains region.83 Plaintiffs felt that EISs which focused
on strictly local effects of individual projects failed to satisfy
the requirements of NEPA, because these separate projects,
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1095-96.
81. Id. at 1096-98.
82. 427 U.S. 390 (1975).
83. Id. at 395.
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when taken together, constituted major federal action. The Si-
erra Club argued that section 102(2)(c) 84 called for examina-
tion of the cumulative effects of all projects existing or
anticipated. 5
The Supreme Court, however, found all the proposals for
federal action to be local or national in scope rather than re-
gional.88 Since there had been no regional report or recom-
mendation made, the Court ruled that no EIS was required
under the language of NEPA. According to the majority, the
court of appeals had erred in applying a four-part balancing
test similar to the one used in SIPI to determine the proper
time for an EIS.8 7
A court has no authority to depart from the statutory lan-
guage and, by a balancing of court-devised factors, deter-
mine a point during the germination process of a poten-
tial proposal at which an impact statement should be
prepared. Such an assertion of judicial authority would
leave the agencies uncertain as to their procedural duties
under NEPA, would invite judicial involvement in the
day-to-day decision-making process of the agencies, and
would invite litigation.8
Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, objected strongly to the limitations that the majority
placed on the ability of federal courts to carry out the intent
of NEPA.e9 Compliance with the statute, he pointed out, often
means preparing impact statements at an early stage. Thus,
situations will arise where an agency that has not yet begun
this environmental review will be in violation of the law. Jus-
tice Marshall saw the four-part test as a useful tool for deter-
mining when judicial intervention might be appropriate.90 He
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
85. Snyder, Comprehensive Impact Statements in Light of Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 7 ENVT'L L. 181, 183.
86. 427 U.S. at 399.
87. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The tests em-
ployed by the appellate court were:
How likely is the program to come to fruition and how soon will that
occur? To what extent is meaningful information presently available on
the effects of implementation of the program, and of alternatives and
their effects? To what extent are irretrievable commitments being made
and options precluded as refinement of proposal progresses? How severe
will be the environmental effects if the program is implemented?
88. 427 U.S. at 406.
89. Id. at 416.
90. Id. at 418-20.
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viewed the majority's fears of undue judicial intervention with
skepticism, and expressed doubts that the lower court's test
would result in preparation of many unnecessary impact
statements.91
Although federal courts seem to agree on the need for ex-
amining the cumulative effects of present and future projects
under NEPA, SIPI and Kleppe illustrate the lack of unanim-
ity as to the scope and timing of such examination. Those
cases also reveal how widely courts differ as to what their own
role should be in implementing the Act. The extent to which
Kleppe overruled SIPI remains unclear.2
California will have to make its own decisions about
whether it is the job of the courts or the legislature to define
the scope of environmental review. The federal cases are help-
ful, however, in illustrating the inevitable difficulties that re-
sult from legislation with ambitious goals and ambiguous re-
quirements. Like NEPA, CEQA is aimed at protecting the
environment for generations to come. It therefore imposes a
future-oriented outlook upon the agencies carrying out its
provisions. The statute demands of these agencies an ability
to predict how the cumulative interaction of present and fu-
ture projects will effect the environment. The extensive litiga-
tion arising under both state and federal statutes suggests
that agencies are finding this requirement unduly burdensome
and confusing. Without clearer guidelines there is little indi-
cation that California can force agencies to maintain the for-
ward-looking thrust so essential to effective environmental
protection.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTING THE
"PROBABLE FUTURE PROJECTS" REQUIREMENT UNDER CEQA
Assuming that present state guidelines do not adequately
prepare agencies to deal with probable future projects, the
question arises as to whether it is really worthwhile to try to
create some sort of uniform approach toward this subject.
Some may believe that it is more realistic to strike the re-
quirement from the statute than to struggle with the practical
administrative difficulties of implementing it. To be sure, ex-
amination of probable future projects poses special problems.
Such assessments often call for extensive research. Local
91. Id. at 421-22.
92. See id. at 406.
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agencies may find themselves ill-equipped to collect and ana-
lyze sophisticated data required for an informed judgment.
Furthermore, resulting delays and expenses are bound to frus-
trate those awaiting approval of their proposals. Public offi-
cials may be leery of onerous requirements that might dis-
courage entrepreneurs from carrying out projects that Would
bring economic benefits to their particular city or county.
On the other hand, communities derive many benefits
from taking a far-sighted approach to environmental plan-
ning. First, by putting potential cumulative effects of present
and future projects in the public eye, local agencies help to
keep the public informed and encourage active citizen partici-
pation at an early stage in the planning process." Secondly,
those proposing projects may find that the need to examine
future as well as present plans actually protects the viability
of their projects by offering an early opportunity to mitigate
any adverse impacts. A third and important advantage of
forcing agencies to look at probable future projects is that it
prevents officials from avoiding CEQA's EIR requirement by
chopping up one major project into a number of minor ones,
none of which would significantly alter the environment by it-
self.9" Finally, the future projects provision, by encouraging a
broad perspective, helps to preserve the objectivity of local of-
ficials whose desire to approve particular projects may be in-
fluenced by parochial interests.
Much as we may want to preserve these benefits, consid-
93. 14 CAL. AD. CODE § 1681.2(b)-(e) provides that the courts of this state have
found the following policies to be implicit in CEQA:
(b) The EIR serves not only to protect the environment but also to
demonstrate to the public that it is being protected. (County of Inyo v.
Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795.)
(c) The EIR is to inform other governmental agencies and the pub-
lic generally of the environmental impact of a proposed project. (No Oil,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68.)
(d) The EIR is to demonstrate to an apprehensive citizenry that the
agency has in fact analyzed and considered the ecological implications of
its action. (People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Bosio, 47 Cal.
App. 3d 495.)
(e) The EIR process will enable the public to determine the envi-
ronmental and economic values of elected and appointed officials thus
allowing for appropriate action come election day should a majority of
the voters disagree. (People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830.)
See also County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 197-200, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 396, 404-06 (1977).
94. 13 Cal. 3d at 283-84, 529 P.2d at 1031, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 263; 42 Cal. App. 3d
at 726, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
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eration of probable future projects always raises questions
about feasibility. Is it actually possible to provide local agen-
cies with guidelines that address the issue of probable future
projects without forcing them to engage in useless specula-
tion? "Probable" is a term open to many interpretations, and
some future projects are obviously more probable than others.
Nevertheless, it seems possible to construct "o f-amework for
examining probable future projects that is iroad enough to
allow agency flexibility, yet sufficiently structu:ed to impose a
clear and uniform duty on every governmental body involved
in proposing or approving projects under CEQA. Such a
framework would rest on one key premise-that agencies have
an affirmative duty to inquire about the existence of probable
future projects. While such an obligation may appear obvious,
CEQA does not spell out such a duty where probable future
projects have not yet been formally proposed. Under such cir-
cumstances local agencies, much like the planning commission
in the hypothetical subdivision example, may choose to limit
the scope of their inquiry to the project currently before them.
The lack of a specific requirement to investigate probable fu-
ture projects allows local agencies to hide behind a lack of in-
formation and to avoid preparation of EIRs in situations
where such documents would clearly be useful. An affirmative
duty to inquire on the part of every permitting agency would
prevent this sort of avoidance.
The inquiry should consist of two phases. The first phase
should include future project plans of the person or entity
proposing the project currently before the local agency. The
second phase should include an independent evaluation con-
ducted by the agency to determine the reasonableness of the
proponent's reply. If a proposing person or entity affirms an
intent to pursue future projects related to the present propo-
sal, then the agency's duty is clear. It must consider the effect
of the present project together with intended future projects
to see if they might exert some significant cumulative effect
on the environment.9 5
If, on the other hand, the project proponent declares that
he plans no future projects, the agency must do more than
accept that statement at face value. The agency must evaluate
the reasonableness of this declaration by first looking at
whether the project as submitted has some independent pur-
95. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21083(b) (West 1977).
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pose. If the significance of the project is clear, then the in-
quiry terminates. If, however, the present project appears use-
less without some further activity, then the agency should
require a written explanation from the proponent stating the
purpose of the project and why there will be no probable fu-
ture project to follow. It was this sort of situation which
prompted the plaintiffs in No Oil to press for further environ-
mental inquiry.96 In that case the permitting agency refused
to consider the environmental effect of eventual commercial
oil drilling, even though there was no purpose to drilling test
wells unless commercial production might follow."
In evaluating a project proponent's statement that he an-
ticipates no future projects, an agency should look at the cir-
cumstances surrounding the present project. It may happen
that, although the proponent is acting in good faith, condi-
tions are such that he may change his mind or that future
projects are likely to follow despite his beliefs. Depending on
the nature of the project, an agency might examine such fac-
tors as population trends, land-use patterns, and special needs
of the immediate and surrounding communities. For example,
an owner might apply for permission to subdivide his land,
fully intending to continue its present use as grazing land. But
if zoning laws permit the land to be developed and the area's
population is growing rapidly, if housing is scarce and this is
the last large parcel of undeveloped land within five miles, an
agency might well find that future development is highly
probable. It must then take that probable future development
into consideration in determining the environmental effect of
the proposed subdivision.
This scheme offers one method for enforcing CEQA's
mandate to consider probable future projects in the environ-
mental review process. It has the virtue of imposing a clear
threshold duty of inquiry on all local agencies. Under this
scheme, those proposing projects, as well as the agencies ap-
proving them, will be encouraged to do early planning with
environmental restrictions in mind as required by CEQA and
the state guidelines. 8 At the same time, the evaluation pro-
cess suggested here, leaves agencies free to arrive at their own
assessments of probability based on analysis of existing data.
96. 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 60, 118 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1974).
97. Id. at 77 n.5, 529 P.2d at 71-72 n.5, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40 n.5.
98. 14 CAL. AD. CODE §§ 1681.3, 1681.5, 1686(b) (West 1980).
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If the likelihood of some future project seems too speculative,
an agency has the discretion to ignore it and narrow its focus
to the project presently proposed.
Although there are methods that might adequately serve
to guide local agencies in their consideration of probable fu-
ture projects, neither the courts nor the California Legislature
has addressed the need for such guidance. There seems little
question that either one or both must assume this responsibil-
ity if CEQA is to afford the protection that its framers
intended.
Jean Y. Eastman

